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Ihe rural revolts of the 1950s in South Africa have received a
considerable amount of attention, raning from contemporary and
sometimes first hand accounts, journalistic investigations, to more
recent scholarly analysis o f the nature of rural protest, 'the role
of political organisations and the significance of the urban/rural
link afforded by the migratory labour system. these separated
instances of rural resistance have been seen in the context of a
general upsurge in black political activity from the late 1940s in
response to ligislation intended to extend control over Africans
and to limit or supress organised political action. Rural protest
was then perceived as a response to new state initiatives. The
declining productivity and carrying capacity of the reserves were
becoming apparent from the 1930s and by the 1940s' it was clear that
a new policy had to be applied to these areas. Hence the advent of
betterment or rehabilitation, devised to check the obvious
ecological crisis facing the reserves. Political life was to be
reshaped through the 1953 Bantu Authorities Act which vested
greater powers in chiefs and headmen compliant with state policy.
Some commentators noted too the obvious shift in social relations
attendant upon such economic and political restructuring - that it
would "concentrate whatever resources remained in the reserves in
the hands of a number of prosperous farmers at the expense of the
bulk of the reserve population". He do not, in general,
question the accuracy of these propositions. However we believe
that these events in the reserves until fairly recently, have been
examined in isolation. They have been subject to sudden scrutiny
and then faded all too frequently from the historians' notice. We
believe that the full significance and impact of these revolts need
examination in the context of the specific social and political
relations appertaining in each region and the nature of state
intervention. By focussing on internal conflicts and events among
the Hurutshe from an earlier period we believe that the motives for
the revolt, and the form it took, become clearer. Furthermore its
importance in reshaping economic circumstances in the reserve and
in determining future relations with the state become clearer from
an analysis of developmentsin Moiloa's reserve in the 1960s and
1970s. This paper then situates the Hurutshe revolt in the wider
context of politics and production in the reserve between 1919 and
1986.
Introduction - Ihe Nineteenth Century
The Hurutshe settled in Hoiloa's Reserve in 1848 under a capable
chief Hoiloa 11, who led his community back to the Iransuaal after
twenty-five years of exile from their former homeland. Moiloa's
followers were given 125,587 morgen of land by the Frekker leader
Andries Potgieter, provided they remained "loyal and obedient" to










difficult. The Hurutshe were expected to provide labour to the
Marico trekkers in lieu of tribute, and to assist Boer commandos in
military engagements against the independent Tswana to the west,
lhe first decade of Moiloa's rule thus was directed towards
avoiding the harsh demands of Trekker overlordship.
Once relations with the ZAR had been placed on firmer foundation
Moiloa's people set about restoring the material and social base of
their society. Productive growth was founded on irrigation, the
introduction of new crops, especially citrus and wheat and upon an
increase in cattle holdings. The Hurutshe capital at Dinokana was
particularly well provided with water from a natural fountain which
flowed into a valley and formed the source of the perennially
flowing Ngotwane River. At the end of Hoiloa's rule in 1875, Em i I
Holub wrote that the
"Bahurutshe in Dinokana gathered in as much as 800 sacks of
/ wheat, each containing 300 lbs, and every year a wider area of
land is being brought under cultivation. Besides wheat they
grow maize, sorghum, melons and tobacco, selling what they do
not require in the markets of the Transvaal and the diamond
fields.... .They have become the most thriving of the Transvaal
Bechuanas."
Hoiloa managed also to increase Hurutshe access to more land,
either by purchasing farms adjoining the location, or by entering
into agreements with local white farmers to run cattle on their
land. Finally Moiloa welded his community together by a process of
political involution (around the person of the chief) and by
re-introducing important social institutions and practices into the
community.
A period of division and conflict with the ZAR attended Hoiloa's
death, but the last 15 years of the century saw a continuance of
agricultural production on one hand and a divergence of economic
activities on the other. These new developments were due largely to
increasing Hurutshe incorporation with the encroaching colonial
economy in Griqualand West, British Bechuanaland and the
Protectorate. They were also due to redoubled efforts in the ZAR to
transform the state and activate its economy in response to demands
from mine-owners and struggling burghers for labour and capital.
The post-annexation ZAR state re-organised its administrative
structure (created by the British) and entrenched and developed new
forms of taxation and labour control. The Hurutshe consequently
were subjected to tax demands on a scale never experienced in the
earlier period o f ' ZAR rule. New and closer markets for fuel and
agricultural products, and the arrival of resident traders and
concessionaires in the reserve further re-shaped the reserve's
economy.
These new relationships with the wider economy cut across and
restructured social relations and productive enterprises in
Hoiloa's Reserve. New avenues of economic gain were opened up for
commoner families as the Hurutshe met their cash requirements
principally as sellers and purveyors of rural merchandise. Chiefs
tended to explore the possibilities of increasing their wealth, not
4so much by increasing production themselves, but rather by
manipulating traditional sourceSgOf authority to grant licenses to
trade and permits to prospect. Between 1891 and 1913 Hurutshe
chiefs accrued til 000 for concessions which were never taken up.
Some of this wealth was re-invested in farms bought for the
community by the chiefs, but a significant amount was appropriated
for their own use.
Natural disasters, the South African Har and the early years of
Crown Colony rule temporarily disrupted these developments and
activities but production picked up again from about 1904 (after
the virulent tast Coast Fever had abated). Greater land-holdings, a
wider market, a larger degree of rural capitalisation and the
withdrawal of Boer competition in the post-war Marico accounted for
this rise in productivity. Kor example in 1905 the Hurutshe
produced 23 OOCLout of 25 000 bushels of wheat grown by Africans in
the Transvaal. In 1910 the Marico Native Commissioner's report
meritiuned that
"cattle are each year improving their quality by introducing a
better class of bull.... All kinds of stock retain their
condition during the whole year. Wheat is grown on irrigable
lands at Oinokana and Schuilpads. At these two places the
Natives are improving their methods of farming and using better
class machinery and manuring the lands."
Even after the passing of. the 1913 Land Act the Herrmannsburg
Missionary to the Hurutshe was able to record that "our people
still now have enough space for agriculture and animal husbandry
for years to come." Land pressure was further forestalled by
the decision of the Beaumont Commission to add 92 000 morgen to the
reserve, most of.which was finally incorporated under the terms of
the 1936 Land Act.
By the end of the second decade of this century a more progressive
peasantry - more commoditised and technologically advanced than
before - was emerging. On the other hand chiefly authorities found
that the Crown Colony, Transvaal and Union governments curtailed
the range of rights and dues.which they had been able to exercise
in the preceding decades. Although some chiefs increased
agricultural production to resolve this deteriorating
position,others did not. In this emergence of anincreasingly
prosperous class of local farmer and threatened chiefly authority
was the source of later social conflict.
"A Model Native Area"
In the 1920s and 1930s there was little abatement in productivity
in Moiloa's Reserve, for example, in 1930 the Moiloa Reserve Local
Council applied for and received a grant o f ^ 1 5 5 0 from the Minister
of Native Affairs for agricultural improvements. These measures
included the construction of dams and irrigation furrows, tht;
erection of a dairy hut to facilitate the marketing of cream, tho
purchase of stud bulls, the provision of a fumigation outfit to
protect citrus trees against disease, and the sinking of a number
of boreholes, ar, well as the maintenance of roads in the reserve.
C o m m e n t i n g on t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s the local N.il.ivp D i m m i s h i u n e r
s t a t e d t h a t i t n e " R e s e r v e b i d s in a f a i r way to b e c o m e a m o d e l
n a t i v e a r e a . "
F u r t h e r , in 1 9 3 G t h e M o i l o a R e s e r v e L o c a l C o u n c i l ( D i n o k a n a )
a p p l i e d for p e r m i s s i o n to e r e c t a c i t r u s p a c k i n g s h e d in o r d e r to
f a c i l i t a t e t h e e x p o r t of o r a n g e s . U n s u r p r i s i n g l y o f f i c i a l s of t h e
D e p a r t m e n t s of A g r i c u l t u r e and N a t i v e A f f a i r s c o n t i n u e d to m a i n t a i n
an i n t e r e s t jp i m p r o v i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l m e t h o d s and o u t p u t t h r o u g h o u t
t h e p e r i o d . A g r i c u l t u r a l s h o w s , d e s c r i b e d as a " m o s t
s u c c e s s f u l i n i t i a t i o n " w e r e h e l d in D i n o k a n a j u s t a f t e r the w a r ,
a f f o r d i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s for e x h i b i t i n g l i v e s t o c k and a g r i c u l t u r a l
p r o d u c t s w h i c h w e r e u s e d to j u s t i f y f u r t h e r c l a i m s for
e x p e n d i t u r e . D e m o n s t r a t i o n p l o t s (for m e n o n l y ) w e r e set up in
1 9 4 8 for t h e i n t e n s i v e g r o w i n g of v e g e t a b l e s . T h e p l o t s w e r e r e n t e d
o u t at t e n ' s h i l l i n g s per a n n u m by t h e R e s e r v e C o u n c i l . A N a t i v e
F a r m e r s A s s o c i a t i o n w a s f o r m a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d in 1 9 4 2 , c o n s i s t i n g of
48 m e m b e r s , l h e A s s o c i a t i o n a r r a n g e d for l o a n s to be m a d e a v a i l a b l e
for the p u r c h a s e .flf a g r i c u l t u r a l i m p l e m e n t s , and for t r a d i n g and
b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e s . F r o m a s u r v e y m a d e by t h e e t h n o g r a p h e r P . L .
B r e u t z in the e a r l y . 1 9 5 0 s D r u m m o n d h a s c o n c l u d e d t h a t "in the
p e r i o d up,, to 1 9 S 7 D i n o k a n a w a s still a c o m p a r a t i v e l y s t r o n g rural
e c o n o m y " . T h i s a s s e r t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by a i r p h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n
in 1 9 5 7 w h i c h " s h o w a p r o s p e r o u s rural e c o n o m y w i t h a d e n s e
p a t c h w o r k l a n d s c a p e of c u l t i v a t e d f i e l d s " .
P o l i t i c s in H o i l o a ' s R e s e r v e . 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 5 7
A s t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n h a s n o t e d , n e w o p p o r t u n i t i e s w e r e c r e a t e d ,
e s p e c i a l l y for p r o g r e s s i v e H u r u t s h e f a r m e r s and s o m e local c h i e f s ,
by t h e e x p a n s i o n of t h e e c o n o m y from the 1 9 2 0 ' s to the 1 9 4 0 ' s . By
the end of t h e s e c o n d d e c a d e t h i s g r o u p had b e g u n to v i e w c e r t a i n
c h i e f s a s a n o b s t a c l e to t h e i r c o n t i n u e d p r o g r e s s . A c c o r d i n g l y they
a t t e m p t e d f i r s t l y to d o m i n a t e c h i e f s w h o s e i n t e r e s t s w e r e
i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i r o w n or s e c o n d l y to e s t a b l i s h an a l t e r n a t i v e
p o w e r s t r u c t u r e to t h e c h i e f ' s t r a d i t i o n a l C o u n c i l in o r d e r to
v o i c e t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s and e x p r e s s t h e i r i n t e r e s t s .
In 1 9 1 9 t h e " p r o g r e s s i v e s " f i r s t b e g a n to i n t e r v e n e in local
H u r u t s h e g o v e r n m e n t . In t h i s y e a r two i n d i v i d u a l s , M i c h a e l M o i l o a
and J o s e p h M o i l o a , w e r e d e s c r i b e d as t h e " p r i m e m o v e r s " in an
a t t e m p t to c o n t r o l - the, n e w H u r u t s h e r e g e n t A l f r e d M o i l o a at
D i n o k a n a . T h e y p r e s e n t e d a d o c u m e n t w h i c h i n c o r p o r a t e d an o a t h and
t e r m s u n d e r w h i c h the n e w c h i e f s h o u l d g o v e r n . At t h i s s t a g e
the N a t i v e C o m m i s s i o n e r w a s q u i c k to r e p r i m a n d the t w o , the N a t i v e
A f f a i r s d e p a r t m e n t b e i n g s e n s i t i v e to s e g r e g a t i o n i s t p r i n c i p l e s
c o n f e r r i n g s p e c i a l r i g h t s u p o n l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t i e s in the
r e s e r v e s .
It w o u l d b e a p t at t h i s p o i n t to d i s c u s s M i c h a e l M o i l o a , o n e of t h e
" p r i m e m o v e r s " , a s it is a r o u n d t h i s i n d i v i d u a l that the i n t e r e s t s
of t h i s g r o u p c o a l e s c e d , and M i c h a e l h i m s e l f b e c a m e t h e i r l e a d i n g
s p o k e s m a n and a c t o r . In 1 9 1 9 M i c h a e l w a s 3 8 y e a r s o l d . F r o m an
e a r l y a g e he had e m b r a c e d the L u t h e r a n f a i t h , had a t t e n d e d t h e
m i s s i o n school to s t a n d a r d e i g h t , and had b e c o m e a w a r d e n in the
H e r m a n s b u r g M i s s i o n . Just b e f o r e the S.A. war he had earned h i m s e l f
the r e p u t a t i o n of a moral c r u s a d e r a g a i n s t d r i n k i n g by A f r i c a n s in
the r e s e r v e . T o g e t h e r with his father and the local m i s s i o n a r y ' s
wife he had been a c t i v e in h a r a s s i n g a local trader, S o u t h w o o d , who
ran a liquor den from the back of his s h o p , the s u g g e s t i v e l y named
"Red Room", w h e r e brandy was d i s p e n s e d f r e e l y , e s p e c i a l l y to,the
c h i e f s , several of w h o m ran up large d e b t s with S o u t h w o o d . By
1919 -Hichael w a s b e c o m i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t l y p r o s p e r o u s c i t r u s
farmer , and was b r i n g i n g m o r e and m o r e land under c u l t i v a t i o n .
In 1924 there is f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e that Michael w a s trying to
e s t a b l i s h h i m s e l f as an a l t e r n a t i v e f o c u s of p o w e r . In this
i n s t a n c e he c o n t r a d i c t e d the i n s t r u c t i o n s of the H u r u t s h e regent at
U i n o k a n a g i v i n g the right to an individual named E p h r a i m to build
next door to. him. Later Michael p l o u g h e d a r o u n d t'phraim's h o u s e
and refused to answer the c h i e f ' s s u m m o n s . "This is not the f i r s t
t i m e " , e x p l a i n e d A l f r e d , "when [ sent for him he did not c o m e . "
in f o r w a r d i n g the r e g e n t ' s c o m p l a i n t to the SNA the Z e e r u s t N a t i v e
C o m m i s s i o n e r added that M i c h a e l :
is a man of w h o m I have reason to hold a very m e a n o p i n i o n , and
one who s u r r e p t i o u s l y m a k e s t r o u b l e . As he is the leading man
among the m i s s i o n s t a t i o n , he has ... i n f l u e n c e . . . . I am
p a r t i c u l a r l y a n x i o u s to m a k e an e x a m p l e of a leading man in
this stad b e c a u s e this is n o t - . t h e first i n s t a n c e of dumb
d e f i a n c e to the c h i e f ' s a u t h o r i t y .
The idea of s u p p o r t i n g the c h i e f l y a u t h o r i t y at any cost w a s , by
the mid 1 9 2 0 ' s , b e g i n n i n g to gain c u r r e n c y in the c i r c l e s of the
N a t i v e A f f a i r s d e p a r t m e n t . In 1925 the NAD e t h n o l o g i s t G. L e s t r a d e
began to research the laws and c u s t o m s of the H u r u t s h e , and his
work has been singled out as being of crucial i m p o r t a n c e "in
l e g i t i m i s i n g both the c o n c e p t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of
s e g r e g a t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s during the '20's and early ' 3 0 ' s . " W i t h
this kind of s p e c i f i c f o c u s on the H u r u t s h e it is hardly s u r p r i s i n g
that the H u r u t s h e c h i e f t a i n s h i p and its legal i n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e
c o n s i s t e n t l y b o l s t e r e d by the local N a t i v e C o m m i s s i o n e r s during
this p e r i o d .
In 1929 the N . C . reported again that Michael had crossed the c h i e f .
After v i s i t i n g Michael the N . C . reported that "he ( M i c h a e l )
e x p r e s s e d the o p i n i o n that if a d e c i s i o n a d v e r s e to his point of
view w e r e to be given it would c a u s e a g r e a t deal of t r o u b l e among
the t r i b e . " By this time the N . C . was r e f e r r i n g to two c l e a r l y
defined g r o u p s , " A l f r e d ' s a d h e r e n t s and M i c h a e l ' s f a c t i o n " who
"have very c o n f l i c t i n g i d e a s " .
In fact M i c h a e l ' s s u p p o r t e r s had by this time found a m o r e s u i t a b l e
i n s t i t u t i o n through w h i c h to a d v a n c e their c o n c e r n s . The idea of
local c o u n c i l s had been mooted by the Native C o m m i s s i o n e r as early
as 1 9 2 1 . f o l l o w i n g the p r i n c i p l e s laid down by the 1920 Native
A f f a i r s A c t . Ihe Act was s o m e t h i n g of an a n o m a l y w i t h i n the general
s e g r e g a t i o n i s t trend of the p e r i o d , in that it attempted to extend
the I r a n s k e i a n s y s t e m of c o u n c i l s m o d e l l e d on the Glen Grey Act of
28
1894. It was to be superceded by Native Administration Act
which restored local powers in the hands of traditional leaders. In
1928 Michael Hoi 1oa and some supporters, principally Johannes
Moiloa, informed the N.C. Zeerust that "the natives wore desirous
that a local council be formed to comprise the whole-district of
H a r i c o in order that there should be co-operation." The local
a u t h o r i t i e s were prepared to accept the idea provided chiefs now
played a central role in the affairs of the c o u n c i l s . Due to
objections from a Hurutshe community at Braklaagte. which resented
being Joined in a sumo body with the Dinokana faction from which it
had broken away in 1908, the formation of the council was delayed.
Finally in fjgvember 1929 the Moiloa Reserve Local Council formally
was gazetted.
The Reserve was divided into several w a r d s , each of which sent
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s nominated by the tax or quitrent payers in each
ward. lhose candidates who could best present themselves as
articulate representatives were the most likely to receive
n o m i n a t i o n . There was no limit on the number of representatives
from each ward. The Council therefore,was a perfect body for those
who wished to exploit its p o t e n t i a l . In 1930 Michael Moiloa and
Simon Mothoagai were nominated to represent Dinokana in Ward 2.
This contrasted with Hard 1 where two chiefs, Lucas Mangope and
Israel Gopane, had been nominated. The N . C , noting that "neither
of the two {Dinokana c h i e f s ) were elected as Ward Representatives"
proposed that the Governor-General be asked to nominate the two
chiefs as additional representatives. Michael in fact,encouraged
the nomination of Chief Alfred Moiloa of Dinokana, and the
proposal was accepted. Thus although some tension existed between
the progressives and traditional chiefs it would be wrong to see
this as a consistent feature of political alliances and positions.
Over certain issues their interests converged and Michael probably
recognised the need to collaborate with the Hurutshe chiefs,
particularly if he was to maintain good relations with the state.
Moreover the continuance of communal tenure allowed chiefs to
control land distribution, which was a strong card in the chiefs'
hands. The chiefs at Motswedi and Gopane moreover, clearly were
engaging in commercial agriculture to an increasing degree in the
first three decades of the century, and were aligning themselves
more closely with the more successful small capitalist producers.
A glance at the minutes of the Local Council indicates the range
and nature of the concerns of this body. On the one hand the
chiefly representatives tried to use the council to regain control
over traditional d u e s . One of their first moves was to attempt to
use council funds to travel to Johannesburg to examine the receipts
of Hurutshe men employed in the m i n e s . Those who had failed to
pay tax could thus be more easily tracked down. As the council drew
its revenue mainly from this local tax, any improvements in tax
collection would place more money at the disposal of the council
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Some funds, as the N.C. suspected, might be
directly appropriated by the c h i e f s .
[he progressives on the other hand exploited the council to improve
agriculture and encourage entrepeneurial activities in the reserve,
of the kind previously mentioned. For example disbursements were
made for the construction of dams, furrows, windmills, boreholes, a
dairy hut and private citrus nursery, and for the fencing of plots.
One of the Council's first acts was to set up a citrus nursery on
demonstration plots in 1931. As a prominent cilfus grower Michael
Moiloa was a major beneficiary of this scheme. As in Pondoland,
both chiefs and progressive farmers "drew the greatest benefit from
agricultural expenditure (in the reserve).'
Abraham Hoi Ioa Assumes Control 1932
The struggle for dominance, both within the council and over wider
Hurutshe society, intensified when Abraham Moiloa assumed
chieftainship in Dinokana in 1932. Abraham was by then ?.Z years
old. He had attended the local school to standard five level before
spending two years at finer Kloof and was by 1932 "fit ... to take
over the chieftainship." Having observed for thirteen years the
slow erosion of the chief's powers at Oinokana under Alfred's
regency, a large section of the v i 1 l a g e r s , R O W looked to the young
chief to restore the traditional order. This Abraham did by
tightening control over his adherents. His advisors backed him in
his efforts, though not all the measures he adopted could have met
wi th general approval.
Abraham's first move was to try to consolidate control over the
outlying Hurutshe community at Braklaagte. The attempt by this
community to maintain its independence from the Dinokana Hurutshe
from whom they earlier had separated is a long and confused legal
and administrative saga. Abraham did however achieve success in his
endeavours for in December 1936 his civil and criminal jurisdiction
over the Braklaagte faction was affirmed by the government.
Abraham also reduced his own council of close advisors
(Khuduthamaga) from seventeen members to seven. One of those
excluded was Michael Moiloa. When he objected to his exclusion
Abraham retorted that Michael was subject to Boas Moiloa, uncle and
close advisor to the young chief. The government was obliged to
accept this condensation of power because Abraham claimed
precedence for such a practice from the time of his grandfather,
Ikalafyn, a fact which was confirmed by Lestrade.
Immediately thereafter Abraham began to tighten up levies on
migrants, taking one pound p.a. from each migrant. He also ensured
that marriage fees (5 shs) were collected on a stricter basis.
Fines for non-payment of dues were imposed and offenders hunted
down. When questioned by the magistrate about these activities
Abraham countered that "I always collect money from my bo«s
returning home and found it like that from my forefathers."
Mfengu communities which had settled in the reserve in 1907 on
separate plots were ordered to relocate in Dinokana, where they
could be subject to closer direction by the chief, and Hurutshe
resident on private farms abutting the reserve similarly were
ordered to re-establish themselves within the reserve. Although the
SNA viewed Abraham's measures "with much displeasure" he was
reluctant to discipline him, particularly when "the tide of (state)
policy was flowing towards a more substantial role for chiefs."
By the end of the 1330's local officials could no longer accept
Abraham's activities and began to criticise him openly. In 1939 the
N.C. reported the "impossible conduct of chief A.G. Moiloa" and
requested the SNA to discipline him for overstepping his authority.
The N.C. had been especially incensed on this occasion by reports
that Abraham had assaulted a white bus driver in the reserve.
Furthermore Abraham's opposition to the HMS was now becoming
manifest to the point where its activities were being openly
undermined. His report concluded that:
As Linokana is an important centre and as the chief's attitude
makes proper administrative contcol impossible, I can suggest
nothing short of summary dismissal.
However chiefs still figured prominently in the government's plans
for maintaining rural order. The Chief Native Commissioner
(Northern District) felt that dismissal would be "both impolitic
and unwarranted" and likely "to cause the Department.considerable
embarassment in its administration of the tribe.' What the
N.A.D. did decide was to remove Abraham's Jurisdiction over the
Hurutshe at Braklaagte and the previous order according Abcaham
this right was cancelled by the Governor-General in 1940. The
withdrawal of control was considered by Abraham and most of the
Hurutshe at Dinokana as a serious loss of authority.
Unfortunately records throughout the 1940's are sparse and we can
only pick up the thread of the conflict again in the 1950's. By
the end of the Second World War important elements in the S.
African state recognised that the carrying capacity of the reserves
needed to be increased and that a radical programme of
rehabilitation needed to be introduced to the reserves. This led
the state to, "play an increasingly interventionist role in the
countryside". The structure for such a role was laid by the
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 which in broad terms "aimed at
Balkanisation along ethnic lines and.the exercise of more effective
political control in Black areas". The tribal councils were to
be abolished and a hierarchical structure of "Bantu authorities"
set up in their stead. Chiefly authorities were of course looked to
to form the essential construct of the system. However there was
less ambiguity now about state support for chieftainship -
recalcitrant chiefs or chiefs who blocked progressive economic
development of the reserve, particularly through resistance to
betterment, would be replaced by compliant authorities. The schisms
and long standing differences which characterised traditional
leadership structures in the countryside made it acceptable and
possible to shore up alternative authorities. In addition the
fomlinson Commission of 1954 envisaged the need for heavy
investment in the reserves, though Verwoerd altered this suggestion
by permitting capitalist development only on the margins of tho
reserves. In seeking to raise productivity within the reserves, the
government desired to hand the control and management of rural
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r e s o u r c e s to a m o r e p r o g r e s s i v e class of local c a p i t a l i s t . Areas
w h e r e long standing social and economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s , m a i n t a i n e d
by c h i e f s who c o n t r o l l e d land in communal tenure and strongly
enforced customary law, w e r e viewed as o b s t a c l e s to further
p r o g r e s s . This, it seems, was the s i t u a t i o n at Oinokana in M o i l o a ' s
R e s e r v e in the m i d - 1 9 5 0 ' s . Even more s i g n i f i c a n t h o w e v e r was the
fact that M i c h a e l ' s followers provided both an a l t e r n a t i v e
c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t base around whom o p p o s i t i o n to A b r a h a m could be
m o u l d e d and a potential l e a d e r s h i p which would be c o n d u c i v e to
d e v e l o p m e n t of the reserve along the lines envisaged by the s t a t e .
G o v e r n m e n t intervention did not therefore create a d i v i s i o n in
H u r u t s h e s o c i e t y , rather it exploited d i f f e r e n c e s which had emerged
over the p r o c e e d i n g three d e c a d e s .
Thus by 1954 A b r a h a m ' s position was becoming i n t o l e r a b l e as he
c o n f r o n t e d a two-pronged a s s a u l t upon his p o s i t i o n . He bitterly
accused Iris b r o t h e r - i n - l a w J o h a n n e s Hoiloa and Michael for
u n d e r m i n i n g his authority by inciting people to appeal against his
j u d g e m e n t s and by c u l t i v a t i n g land w i t h o u t his p e r m i s s i o n . He also
accused J o h a n n e s of being in league with the Rev C. Meyer of the
H e r m a n s b u r g M i s s i o n . Seeking the u l t i m a t e s t i g m a t i s a t i o n of his
o p p o n e n t s in the eyes of the a u t h o r i t i e s , A b r a h a m alleged that
J o h a n n e s "organised certain tribesmen who called their party
Ipelegeng (help y o u r s e l f ) . This party a f f i l i a t e d itself to the
C o m m u n i s t Party. Its aim was to have a new chief J o h a n n e s Moiloa,
to rule over my p e o p l e . "
But the Chief C o m m i s s i o n e r rejected these a l l e g a t i o n s . "Johannes
M o i l o a " , he w r o t e to the SNA, "is a very active member of the
Hoiloa R e s e r v e Board Council and he has been o u t s t a n d i n g in his
e n d e a v o u r s to assist the d e p a r t m e n t . . . . The Native C o m m i s s i o n e r
reports that he has a l w a y s found him loyal and r e l i a b l e . "
Before the end of 1955 Abraham had closed the L u t h e r a n c h u r c h and
b o y c o t t e d its centenery c e l e b r a t i o n s and had spoken out against the
Bantu A u t h o r i t i e s Act, the Bantu Education Act and the suggested
removal of the H u r u t s h e "black s p o t s " of B r a k l a a g t e and
L e e u f o n t e i n . He was d e s c r i b e d as a "thorn in the flesh of the
D e p a r t m e n t " (of Native A f f a i r s ) and was placed under i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,
"with a view to requesting the d e p a r t m e n t to remove him from the
c h i e f t a i n s h i p and banish him from Z e e r u s t . " A s u b s e q u e n t
inquiry c o n d u c t e d by the Native C o m m i s s i o n e r for P i l a n e s b e r g found
A b r a h a m " g u i l t y " of eighteen c h a r g e s of m i s c o n d u c t . T h e s e
a c c u s a t i o n s , it is important to note, w e r e not post hoc
J u s t i f i c a t i o n s for his later d e p o s i t i o n .
In c o n t r a s t it is evident that Abraham from his side w a s exploiting
these issues to revive support for the c h i e f t a i n s h i p , and for his
own position which was being t h r e a t e n e d . Moreover by m i d - 1 9 5 5 he
had found support from an u n e x p e c t e d q u a r t e r . P r e v i o u s a n a l y s e s of
the H u r u t s h e revolt have credited the ANC with only a belated entry
into the a f f a i r . The usual e x p l a n a t i o n for this is that the
m o v e m e n t either had little interest in rural areas or, though
c o n c e r n e d with rural r e s i s t a n c e , that or its o r g a n i s a t i o n a l base
was too weak to extend its a c t i v i t i e s beyond its e s s e n t i a l l y urban
11
53
stronghold. In addition, according to Hooper, who personally
travelled to Johannesburg to speak to Luthuli in order to gain ANC
assistance, the leaders were pre-occupied with the treason trial at
this time, ,-a) though they did attempt to make "contingency
arrangements". Further distortion has arisen from the,-state's
subsequent attempts to implicate and incriminate the ANC. There
clearly was an ANC presence in the reserve from about 1955 though
little groundwork had been laid down by the organisation.
Furthermore, although the evidence is sparse, Hurutshe migrants
probably offered a close though concealed link between urban
politics and the rural matrix from which they were drawn. In the
latter half of this year Abraham spent several weeks away from the
reserve consulting with Hurutshe migrants in Johannesburg. No
information was obtainable regarding this contact but Abraham's
subsequent attitude and actions suggest he liaised closely with
several prominent Hurutshe ANC individuals resident in
Johannesburg. By April 1956 the SAP Commissioner sent a lengthy
confidential memorandum to the SNA detailing the careers of two of
these men, Kenneth Mosenyi and Nimrod Moagi, and informing him
of their close connection to Abraham. It was probably more than
just a relationship of convenience for in the ANC's resistance to
betterment and the Bantu Authorities Act Abraham undoubtedly
perceived both the ideological message and an organisational
structure which could be harnessed for his struggle to maintain the
traditional rural order in Moiloa's reserve.
By May 1956 Richter, the newly-arrived Native Commissioner in
7eerust, accused Abraham of "interfering with the Police, the
messenger of the Court, the Postal Officials, the Churches and
local farmers." One of the main official objections to Abraham
found clear expression in this correspondence. The Commissioner of
Native Affairs in Potchefstroom and Richter wished to remove
Abraham "so we can declare Moiloa's reserve a betterment area, but
with Abraham in the reserve he will mobilise people against it....
It is clear too that he is under the influence of Hosinjfi and
Nimrod Moagi, instead of experienced men like Michael Moiloa."
This then was the situation by the end of 1956 four months before
the Reference Book Unit arrived to issue passes to women in the
reserve. Abraham's resistance to passes for women and his
determination to support the women of the reserve have been fully
documented. The affair should be seen however in the context of
his long-standing struggle with the class of small capitalist
producers, who by the early 1950's were in a close alliance with
the state. Abraham's tragedy was that by the end of 1957 he had
clearly won the total support of the small peasant producers who
rallied behind the chief in defence of their rural resources, but
he completely lost control of the Hurutshe chieftaincy at Dinokana.
This kind of attraction to chieftaincy by rural communities under
stress has been explored by Beinart in the context of the Eastern
C a p e . Chieftaincy "provided the kind of institution and set of
symbols behind which rural people could WR'te at a local level and
stake claims to land and communal rights."
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Events in Moiloa's reserve after 1957 reveal even more clearly the
workinyu of an alliance of class interests that were to determine
politics and production in the reserve. Abraham was deposed and
fled to Bechuanaland. His uncle. Boas Hoiloa, was considered unfit
to rule because of his "close collaboration with the Africa^
National Congress even long before Abraham was deposed."
Subsequently Boas himself was banished from the district. Host of
the other chiefly figures associated with Abraham, such as Simon
Molife in Dinokana and Lekolani Moiloa at Leeuwfontein, similarly
were stripped of their representative positions.
On the other hand, in Dinokana, one Harks Hoiloa, nephew of Michael
and a member of the reserve council, was appointed as a temporary
chief. When he fell ill shortly thereafter the crisis in leadership
was solved by the appointment in September 1958 of Hichael Hoitoa
himself. Hichael's appointment was vehemently opposed in the
Reserve. In Hay 1959 a deputation approached the Bantu Affairs
Commissioner in Zeerust and requested the convening of a tribal
meeting to determine the strength of support for their deposed
chief. However the leader of the deputation was described by the
N.C. as "having sided with the rebelious (j»4c) element" and for
this reason their request was turned down. Ultimately however
Michael lost control in Oinokana and early in 1960 he asked to give
up the chieftaincy. His departure occasioned a further crisis. The
government, having intervened so decisively in the affairs of the
Hurutshe, was determined not to restore to power any elements
associated with the old order. P-L Breutz and N.P. van Warmelo as
authorities on Hurutshe ethnology, were brought in to find an
acceptable chief with some relation to the ruling family.
Eventually a chief from Braklaagte- Israel Moiloa, was brought in
to fill the chieftaincy in Dinokana.
Chiefs who had sided with the state and whom the authorities
regarded as receptive to political and economic restructuring of
the reserve were entrenched in positions of authority. Chief Lucas
Mangope was earmarked to head the Bahurutshe Regional Authority,
the first of its kind in the Transvaal. He died before he could
assume this position but his son Lucas took up the appointment. In
1961 L.H. Hangope became deputy of the fswana Territorial
Authority. Similarly Chief Edward Lencoe was appointed a member of
the Motswedi fribal Authority and Chief Gopane of the Gopane Tribal
Authority. In 1971 the Tswana Territorial Authority was advanced to
the next stage of self government through the formation of an
Executive Council and Legislative Assembly, and in 1972 the new
territory of Bophuthatswana became self governing.
Economic Decline 1957-1986
After 1957 there commenced a process of rapid economic
transformation of the reserve. The potential for the concentration
of productive activities in the hands of a local capitalist class
consisting of chiefly families and a salaried bourgeoisie was
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greatly increased, whilst smaller peasant-based production declined
considerably. for example in )959 Chief Lucas Mangope applied for
permission to construct a malt factory to convert sorqhum to malt
to sell to the Reef Municipalities to brew beer. Ihe proposal was
strongly supported by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner but
floundered due to a shortfall of capital to establish the
factory. It was however the kind of activity the state sought
to e n c o u r a g e . In the early 1960s a prominent farmer, Piet
Mohalelo, (who by his own admission was a "spy" for the police in
the 1915/ u n r e s t ) produced up to ninety bags of wheat annually which
he sold to the Wheat Board in Zeerust at an average of two pounds
fifty a bag. He also grew cabbages, beans and peas apd employed
from ten to twenty labourers depending on the season. In 1962
Mohalelo was featured in an article in Banju. (the journal of the
Native Affairs Department) entitled "Fertile Dinokana", in which be
was held up as an example of a progressive reserve farmer.
M o s e n y i . described Mohalelo as "one of the men who took power after
1957". According to Mosenyi there were "more than thirty"
substantial wheat producers in Moiloa's Reserve who were organised
as a branch of the African National Veld Conservation Society
which, amongst other a c t i v i t i e s , attempted to increase yelds of
wheat.
However other reasons combined to stunt the activities of all
categories of producers in Hoiloa's Reserve. The disturbances
themselves curtailed farming for two years and many people fled
their homes for Bechuanaland, some never to return. There was a
severe drought between 1962-1966 and a simultaneous outbreak of
disease among the villagers' fruit trees, which were an important
source of food as well as providing some cash income. The fact
that neighbouring Botswana received independence in 1966 was also a
blow to the economy since this was accompanied by the strict
enforcement of the previously open and fluid border between
Moiloa's Reserve and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In turn, this
reduced available agricultural resources since previously Dinokana
farmers had maintained cattle posts near Kanye in Botswana.
Influx control limited the possibilities for capital accumulation
which could be in-invested within the reserve, finally in the
1370s "black spot" removals and influx control added over 13,000
people to the reserve's population, leading to overcrowding, the
erosion of pastures and a fall in crop y i e l d s . The area of
cultivated land around Dinokana fell from 470 hectares to 206
hectares between 1957 and 1984, a decline which in all probability,
was matched elsewhere in the reserve.
Increasing numbers of small peasant producers thus abandoned the
land to enter migratory labour, and the reserve was transformed
from an essentially peasant economy to a labour reserve economy, a
pattern characteristic of all rural economies being incorporated
into the South African economy, though the intensity and ranges of
this process occured differentially over time and region. S i m k i n s '
periodisation of the period of "rapid decline" of the reserves in
the years between 1955-1969 w ^ l d thus appear to be substantiated
in the case of Moiloa's reserve.
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The ensuing crisis engendered by the state's attempts to "develop"
the reserves and by the extension of influx control and forced
r e m o v a l s , called for yea a further response, usually under the
rubric of "homeland d e v e l o p m e n t " . The B o p h u t h a t s w a n a g o v e r n m e n t ,
in attempting to proclaim its independence by purusing a policy of
" n a t i o n a l " s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , established in 1978 the para-statal
Agricultural D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n of B o p h u l h a t s w a n a ( A G R I C O R ) .
lhe goal of this body was to promote broadly-based economic and
social d e v e l o p m e n t in rural c o m m u n i t i e s through the formation of
agricultural p r o j e c t s . With its rich groundwater resources
M o i l o a ' s reserve offered a good site to r e c o n s t r u c t a g r i c u l t u r e in
an area w h e r e it was perceived to have c o l l a p s e d . In the early
1980s a rice project was started at D i n o k a n a , a scheme which meshed
well with B o p h u t h a t s w a n a ' s attempts to form ties with Taiwan at
this period. One hundred and twenty local producers were thus
organised on a c o - o p e r a t i v e basis to farm rice under T a i w a n e s e
guidance on 4b hectares of tribal land. In 1984 another project
was e s t a b l i s h e d , this time under Israeli d i r e c t i o n , to establish a
vegetable growing project near D i n o k a n a . Although initially aimed
at a local market AGRICOR soon switched to a broader market when
the p r o f i t s from the sale o f , c h e a p ; vegetables could not begin to
match the costs of the project.
Although too early to tell, "the 'ssue of whether any development
has taken place is a moot point". In time the production of
foodstuffs may increase. However the interim effect has been to
c o n c e n t r a t e resources in the hands of a state controlled body aided
by foreign investors freqeutnly looking for quick-fix s o l u t i o n s .
Stripped of vital water supplied to feed the extensive computerised
irrigation systems used by the projects and of some of their best
land, the vestigal independent Hurutshe farmers have cut back
p r o d u c t i o n . M o h a l e l o , now embittered and in an increasingly
desperate position, struggles to find the wages to pay his workers
who can earn more on the p r o j e c t s . Some of the former successful
producers probably left the land and, under H a n g o p e ' s p a t r o n a g e ,
found a niche in the homeland s t r u c t u r e s . What precisely happened
to this class of "progressive f a r m e r s " whose e x p e c t a t i o n s were
raised in the late 1950's, remains to be investigated.
This position has been challenged, albeit feebly, by the local
v i l l a g e r s . Women have attempted to smash the irrigation system and
the chief (a supporter of the projects and M . P . for the ruling
p a r t y ) had his house bombed in 198G. More recently, villagers
stole crops from the A g r i c o r project, and also have attempted to
plough on lands now used by the rice p r o j e c t . O p p o s i t i o n to the
homeland state is recognised as being at a fairly high and
sustained level in Oinokana and some of
 vthe surrounding v i l l a g e s .
C o n c l u s i o n
The ferocity of the Hurutshe resistance to passes for women and the
degree of intra-Hurutshe conflict has surprised most commentators
of this event. This paper a r g u e s that the reason for this lies in
the e m e r g e n c e of class a n t a g o n i s m s that found sudden and violent
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expression in the events of the mid-19S0's. He have tried to
delineate the emergence of these divisions from the 19?0's and to
account for state interventiorvention on behalf of the Hurutshe
capitalist farmers and rural bourgeoisie. It was only after the
crushing of the revolt and the destruction of the integrative
character of chieftaincy in Dinokana that the state could promote
its ambitions for rural change in Hoiloa's Reserve. This was done
in collaboration with a chiefly class of entrepreneur which doubled
as a local authority prepared to play a key role in the creation of
the bantustans and later the homelands of South Africa. As it
turned out the policy of improvement based on betterment never came
to full fruition although "betterment planning" was being
implemented as recently as the early 1980's. This gave rise to the
final transformative phase in the reserve's history - project
farming and agribusiness.
This -paper- has shown that the transformation of African rural
production in Moiloa's Reserve was determined by several factors:
specifically the circumstances shaping the material conditions in
this region, the degree to which capitalist penetration had
transformed rural economic and political structures before the
adoption of the major political and socio-economic measures
associated with the creation of the modern South African state, the
shifting nature of segregationist ideology and state alliances with
social forces in the countryside, and finally the ambiguous and
changeable nature of political alliances and interests within the
reserves. These observations are not new. They have been subtly
explored in a number of rural contexts in South Africa. What we
have done is to provide a chronological focus on a hitherto
unexplored region in order to provide another piece in the mosaic
of rural history and the trajectory of rural change.
A. Hanson and J. Orummond
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